


















































































































































Productivity Swings and Housing Prices
James A. Kahn
The housing boom and bust of the last decade, often attributed 
to “bubbles” and credit market irregularities, may owe much to 
shifts in economic fundamentals. A resurgence in productivity that 
began in the mid-1990s contributed to a sense of optimism about 
future income that likely encouraged many consumers to pay 
high prices for housing. The optimism continued until 2007, when 
accumulating evidence of a slowdown in productivity helped 
dash expectations of further income growth and stiﬂ  e the boom 
in residential real estate. 
A 
widely held view among market observers is that the rapid growth in home 
prices from the mid-1990s until the recent crash reﬂ  ected a “bubble,” brought 
on by excessively lax lending standards and a belief that house prices would 
increase indeﬁ  nitely.1 In this view, the bubble was destined to burst, triggering a 
dramatic decline in the housing sector. 
This edition of Current Issues offers a different perspective on the source of the 
housing boom and bust of the last decade. We argue that changing economic funda-
mentals—speciﬁ  cally, swings in labor productivity, or output per hour of work—
played a signiﬁ  cant role in the movements of housing prices.2 These productivity 
swings helped determine the price of housing through their effects on income growth 
and long-term income expectations—factors that directly inﬂ  uence what consumers 
are ready to pay for housing and what mortgage providers are willing to lend. 
Using a recently developed model of housing prices,  we show how a large share 
of price ﬂ  uctuations over the last forty-ﬁ  ve years can be attributed to changes in 
productivity growth. Applied to the most recent housing cycle, the model suggests that 
the surge in home prices from the mid-1990s to 2007 was fueled at least in part by 
the belief that ongoing productivity advances would lead to continued strong growth 
in income. The relationship worked in reverse as evidence mounted in 2007 that 
productivity growth had slowed: At that time, expectations of further income growth 
declined, helping to quash the housing boom and jeopardizing mortgages and other 
investments predicated on continued expansion. 
This argument attaches considerable importance to the perception of productivity 
shifts. Housing market participants were slow to perceive the most recent decline in 
the rate of productivity growth because the data released through mid-2007 gave little 
indication of it. Subsequent revisions of the data made it clear that productivity had 
in fact begun to decelerate in 2004. Nevertheless, given the information available 
through much of the current decade, borrowers and lenders might reasonably have 
inferred that productivity growth remained strong—an inference that would encour-
age optimism about income prospects and hence higher expenditures on housing.
1  See, for example, Baker (2006).
2  During the housing boom, McCarthy and Peach (2005) put forward a similar argument, although it was 
based on different methods. Himmelberg, Mayer, and Sinai (2005) contend that in most local markets, 
prices did not appear to be misaligned with economic fundamentals.2
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Of course, we do not discount the view that other factors, such 
as changes in interest rates and credit market conditions, con-
tributed to the surge and decline in home prices. Our contention 
is simply that an exclusive focus on these factors obscures the 
arguably equally important inﬂ  uence of productivity swings on 
housing and thus exaggerates the role of credit markets.
Parallel Trends in House Prices and Productivity
Since the early 1960s, movements in inﬂ  ation-adjusted house prices 
have broadly resembled sustained movements in labor productivity 
relative to its long-term trend.  A look at aggregate U.S. home price 
indexes3 over the last half-century reveals three major trends in 
inﬂ  ation-adjusted home prices: rising prices through the 1970s, a ﬂ  at 
or declining period between 1979 and the mid-1990s, and a decade 
of strong growth through 2007 (Chart 1).4 
These broad patterns correspond roughly with movements 
in productivity around its historical average trend (Chart 2). The 
upswing in house prices in the 1960s and 1970s took place when 
productivity was believed to be trending up at an annual rate 
of nearly 3 percent. A period of real price declines that began in 
the late 1970s coincided with the recognition of a productivity 
growth slowdown to a sustained rate of less than 1.5 percent. The 
second boom in housing prices, which started in the late 1990s, 
3  We deﬂ  ate the indexes by an aggregate price index known as the personal 
consumption expenditures deﬂ  ator to eliminate swings in home values in 
response to overall price inﬂ  ation. For instance, home prices rose in actual dollars 
more rapidly in much of the high-inﬂ  ation 1970s than in the past decade—but 
the economics underlying the current-dollar price run-ups in the two periods 
were quite different.
4  The differences between the indexes reﬂ  ect both conceptual differences 
and indexation bias. For example, because new homes tend to be built on less 
expensive land, their prices are typically less sensitive to land values than are 
the prices of existing homes.
occurred around the time many analysts determined that pro-
ductivity had rebounded to its earlier high-growth rate. Finally, 
the latest downturn in housing prices and housing sector activity 
coincides with signs of a deceleration in productivity. 
While the observed association of prices and productivity 
movements is suggestive, it does not necessarily imply an 
economic connection between the two. In the next section, we 
explain why productivity trends inﬂ  uence housing prices. 
Economic Fundamentals and Housing Prices
During the most recent housing boom, the Census’ constant-
quality index of new home prices, adjusted for inﬂ  ation, rose 
approximately 33 percent. In the bust following the ﬁ  rst-quarter 
2007 peak, that same measure has fallen by nearly 15 percent.5 
The sharp swings in house prices raise a question: Are these 
movements driven by economic fundamentals, or by irrational 
behavior that can trigger bubbles and busts? One indication of a 
bubble is that “the level of prices has been bid up beyond what is 
consistent with underlying fundamentals” (McCarthy and Peach 
2005).  This observation suggests that a logical way to explore the 
forces behind the recent housing price movements is to establish 
the magnitude and timing of the price shifts that would be 
warranted by changes in fundamentals alone. 
Calculations of this kind require the use of an economic 
model. In this article, we employ a model that emphasizes one 
fundamental, trend productivity growth, as a key driver of 
5  The increase occurred from the fourth quarter of 1995 to the ﬁ  rst 
quarter of 2007.  Prices of existing homes rose considerably more during 
a similar period—66 percent according to the FHFA index and more than 
90 percent by the S&P/Case-Shiller series—and have subsequently fallen 
sharply from their peaks (9 percent for the FHFA index and nearly 
30 percent for the S&P/Case-Shiller index).
Sources: Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA); U.S. Bureau of the Census; 
Standard and Poor’s (S&P).
Note: The vertical axis is a logarithmic scale.
Chart 1
Trends in U.S. Inflation-Adjusted Home Price Indexes
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housing price trends.6 Productivity growth is especially well 
suited for a model of aggregate house prices. Many of the other 
fundamentals that affect housing prices—demographic factors, 
density (the availability of land per capita), interest rates, taxes, 
and local government regulations affecting new construction 
(see Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saks [2005])—can vary widely across 
regions; they may result in local booms or busts (see Himmelberg, 
Mayer, and Sinai [2005]) but will average out or dissipate in the 
aggregate. Productivity growth, by contrast, varies substantially 
over time in the economy as a whole. It exhibits precisely the kinds 
of unexpected but long-lasting changes that have the potential to 
inﬂ  uence the forward-looking price of an asset like housing. 
How does productivity growth inﬂ  uence house prices? Econo-
mists generally regard productivity growth as the single most 
important determinant of long-run trends in household income. 
Thus, stronger productivity growth will lead to both faster 
income growth and higher expectations for future income. In 
turn, a sustained rise in income will signiﬁ  cantly strengthen the 
current and future demand for housing. Finally, the increase in 
demand will drive up the price of land and hence “the rental price 
of housing,”—that is, the market price of the services (space and 
shelter) that owners derive from living in their homes.
A house is an asset, so its price should reﬂ  ect the value, 
discounted to the present, of the services that the house provides 
over its lifetime. Thus, the price of a house will depend not only 
on current income, but also on expectations of future income 
growth, because together they drive the present and future 
demand for housing services. 
A Model of Housing Prices
Drawing on the relationships between productivity, income, and 
demand, the model quantiﬁ  es the impact of changes in productivity 
trends on the magnitude and timing of house price movements 
over the 1963-2008 period. To this end, the analysis incorporates 
“real-time” assessments of productivity trends over the past forty-
ﬁ  ve years. These assessments, computed using a methodology 
presented in Kahn and Rich (2006, 2007), draw on vintage 
data sets to detect shifts between “regimes” of high productiv-
ity growth and low productivity growth from the viewpoint of 
housing market participants at various points in the past. In 
other words, these calculations tell us when market participants, 
responding to the information available at the time, were able to 
recognize that a sustained slowdown or acceleration of productivity 
growth was under way. Such a recognition would be necessary 
before changes in productivity could be expected to alter income 
expectations or to prompt a reversal in the growth pattern of 
housing prices. Thus, by including the real-time assessments in 
the model, we are better able to explain the timing of the house 
price movements in recent decades. Indeed, as we shall see, the 
turning points in housing prices correlate well with the shifts in 
productivity trends as they were discerned in real time.
6  The model is described in greater detail in Kahn (2008a).
Our model predicts a path for house prices over 1963-2008 
that is based on the productivity data and on estimates of the 
relationship between income, house prices, and demand. When 
productivity growth accelerates, the amount by which house 
prices will rise depends on certain basic supply and demand rela-
tionships. The fact that land, a ﬁ  nite resource, is a relatively large 
component of housing (compared with its “share” in other goods) 
makes the overall supply of housing relatively unresponsive to 
demand changes; the supply of houses cannot expand indeﬁ  nitely 
to meet increases in demand.  In addition, because housing is 
viewed as a necessity that has no obvious substitute among other 
kinds of goods, consumers faced with a rise in housing prices will 
be relatively unwilling to curtail their demand for housing. Thus, 
the demand for housing services is relatively inelastic—that is, 
insensitive to price changes. Indeed, our model incorporates 
a very low demand elasticity of 0.3, based on the calculations 
described in the box above. This combination of price-inelastic 
demand and supply means that productivity swings affecting the 
demand for housing can result in large changes in house prices.7 
How large? According to our model, the insensitivity of 
housing demand to price changes implies that in times of above-
average economic growth, house prices can grow faster than 
income (and faster than rents) for periods of many years, even 
decades. In an expanding economy, an inelastic demand for 
7  The model assumes an income elasticity of one—meaning that the demand for 
housing services, holding prices ﬁ  xed, rises one-for-one with increases in income. 
The Elasticity of Demand
A product’s demand elasticity is considered low (less than 1) if, in 
response to a price increase, total spending—price times quantity—
on the product increases; it is considered high (greater than 1) if total 
spending decreases. The intermediate case (elasticity of 1) exists when 
spending on a product does not vary in response to a price change—in 
other words, the reduced quantity just offsets the price increase. 
To determine elasticity as accurately as possible, we can look across 
different locations and time periods for variation in the cost of hous-
ing services to ascertain the extent to which expenditures on housing 
services rise or fall with changes in their cost. The more elastic the 
demand, the smaller the increase in housing expenditures for a given 
price increase. Speciﬁ  cally, in response to an x percent price increase, 
expenditures rise by x (1–  ε) percent, where ε is demand elasticity. For 
example, suppose over a ten-year period the price of housing services 
increased 10 percent in one region, relative to the prices of other goods, 
while relative expenditures on housing rose 6 percent. This would imply 
an elasticity of 0.4. 
In a regional analysis, Kahn (2008a) arrives at elasticity estimates 
of 0.2 to 0.3 using the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Consumer Expenditure 
Survey data; Flavin and Nakagawa (2008) produce an even smaller 
estimate of 0.13 using data from the University of Michigan’s Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics. The ﬁ  ndings are consistent with earlier 
results on the relatively inelastic demand for housing.4
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housing services requires the price of land, and therefore the price 
of housing, to rise to a level above its long-run trend—with more 
new homes being built—before supply and demand equalize. 
The opposite is true if the economy slows: If demand for housing 
is very insensitive to price, the price of land and housing will need 
to fall to a level below trend. In essence, price-inelastic demand 
results in a “multiplier effect,” in which home prices grow faster 
than income during housing booms and decline faster than 
income during contractions. This is precisely what happened 
during the recent housing boom and bust in the United States 
and in similar episodes that occurred earlier in time or in other 
countries.8 While such price swings are often cited as an indica-
tion of a “bubble,” we argue that they can arise naturally from 
productivity shifts affecting the demand for housing.
The Recognition of Shifts in Productivity Growth
We argued earlier that the timing and magnitude of house price 
movements will depend on housing market participants’ recogni-
tion of changing productivity trends. Signiﬁ  cantly, this recogni-
tion can lag the actual trend shift by a number of years. To shed 
light on market participants’ perception of productivity changes, 
we draw on the Kahn-Rich (2006, 2007) methodology described 
earlier, which detects shifts in the mean growth of rate of labor 
productivity between regimes of high and low growth. 
We ﬁ  rst identify these shifts “retrospectively,” using all data 
currently available in order to capture the magnitude and timing 
of the shifts with the accuracy that hindsight allows. The retro-
spective assessments in the 2006-07 studies by Kahn and Rich, 
for example, revealed a shift from high mean growth to low mean 
growth in 1973, and a move back to high mean growth in 1997. 
In this analysis, using data through 2008—which include, signiﬁ  -
cantly, data revisions back to 2004 that were released in August 
2007—we ﬁ  nd that another switch from high to low mean 
growth likely occurred in mid-2004 (Chart 3). 
Next, we use the Kahn-Rich methodology to determine when 
housing market participants were likely to recognize that these 
regime shifts had taken place. For this step, we employ, when pos-
sible, “vintage” data sets that capture the information that would 
have been available to market participants at the time. This effort 
to identify the trend shifts in real time—without the beneﬁ  t of 
hindsight—yields telling results. Applied to the 1970s, the real-
time assessment does not detect a productivity slowdown until 
1979, some six years after we now know the slowdown occurred.9 
This recognition lag stems primarily from the unprecedented 
nature of the slowdown; after twenty-ﬁ  ve years of high productiv-
8  See Kahn (2008b).
9  Edge, Laubach, and Williams (2007) cite other documentary evidence 
of this lag. Moreover, 1979 was the year in which a number of studies on 
“the productivity slowdown” ﬁ  rst appeared (for example, Denison [1979]). 
Interestingly, a June 2001 presentation to the Federal Open Market Committee 
(Steindel 2001) suggests that there were signs of an impending productivity 
slowdown as early as the late 1960s, but notes “how hard it is to detect in real 
time that the productivity trend is shifting and by how much.” 
ity growth (the entire period over which data had been collected), 
market participants would have been likely to interpret signs of 
slackening productivity as a temporary outcome of the 1973-75 
recession rather than the start of a sustained period of lower 
productivity growth. Applying the same method of identifying 
real-time productivity changes to the most recent period, we ﬁ  nd 
that market participants would not have recognized the 2004 
shift to low productivity growth until 2007.  In this case, the delay 
arose because the data available in 2004-06 suggested continuing 
high productivity growth—a favorable outlook that would not be 
overturned until the release of revised data in August 2007.
The delays we have identiﬁ  ed support our contention that it is 
the perception of changes in trend productivity growth that gives 
rise to movements in housing prices. Both in 1979 and 2007, the 
recognition of a productivity growth slowdown that had been 
under way for a few years coincided with the onset of a signiﬁ  cant 
decline in housing prices.  
To illustrate how the data available at different points in the 
past would lead to diverse predictions about future productivity 
growth, Chart 4 presents ﬁ  ve-year-ahead forecasts of productivity 
growth based on the information available before and after the 
August 2007 benchmark revisions. As of June 2007, strong produc-
tivity growth was expected to continue—a belief that would have 
provided support for house prices; after the August 2007 release 
of revised data, the predicted growth rate fell sharply, by roughly 
100 basis points. A more recent forecast, based on data released 
in August 2008, suggests continued slow growth.10
We do not contend, of course, that housing market partici-
pants actively forecast productivity growth in this manner, or 
10  This productivity forecast is regularly updated at <http://www.newyorkfed
.org/research/national_economy/richkahn_prodmod.pdf>.
Source: Author’s calculations.
Note: Estimates are based on data through the month indicated. 
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indeed at all. The forecasts produced by the Kahn-Rich metho-
dology should be seen only as estimates of how participants’ 
expectations evolved over time. Nevertheless, major shifts in 
housing prices roughly coincided with the shifts in these fore-
casts. A basic principle of economics is that prices incorporate 
more information than any one participant possesses. Each 
individual might only have a sense of his or her own future 
income prospects when deciding on housing expenditures, but 
the combined actions of a large number of individuals may result 
in prices that roughly reﬂ  ect their collective information.  
Productivity and Income
We have suggested that productivity growth inﬂ  uences hous-
ing prices through its effects on income. We recognize, however, 
that income growth can stem from sources other than long-
term changes in productivity—most notably, increases in labor 
force participation or hours of work per household. While these 
alternative sources of income growth might be expected to affect 
household demand and expenditure patterns, they may be less 
likely than productivity growth to inﬂ  uence housing prices. 
First, the additional household income generated from 
increased labor force participation may be partially offset by 
additional expenses (see Aguiar and Hirst [2008]). For example, 
homemakers who enter the labor force may be obliged to pay for 
child care, transportation, clothing, and food away from home. 
Such outlays would reduce the impact that higher household 
earnings stemming from increased labor force participation 
would have on the demand for housing services. 
Second, the changes in workforce participation that result 
from shifting population demographics such as the aging of 
the baby-boomers or the increased presence of women in the 
labor force are relatively predictable. Supply and demand will 
therefore anticipate these changes, diminishing their impact on 
house prices. 
Third, because labor force participation cannot grow without 
bound, its effects on income growth will necessarily be ﬁ  nite. 
There are only so many people who can join the workforce and 
only so many work hours in the day.  Thus, as the increases in 
labor force participation, particularly among married women, 
reached their limit in the mid-1990s, household income growth 
should have begun to slow. The fact that household income 
instead grew at a rate that was higher than expected (albeit not 
that much higher in absolute terms) was the direct result of the 
productivity resurgence after 1995.11 
The same considerations that lead us to question whether 
predictable changes in labor force participation could signiﬁ  -
cantly affect the price of housing serve to strengthen the link 
between productivity shifts and house prices. Productivity 
growth boosts the income of individual workers without impos-
ing additional expenses on the household. Moreover, trend shifts 
between regimes of high and low productivity growth occur 
unexpectedly, and productivity—unlike labor force participa-
tion—can increase indeﬁ  nitely. 
Results Derived from the Model
To implement our model, we incorporate in it the patterns of 
productivity growth and regime changes over the past forty-ﬁ  ve 
years—and equally important, estimates of housing market par-
ticipants’ real-time assessments of productivity growth—with 
the aim of determining their implications for housing prices. 
Chart 5 presents the results of this exercise for the 1963-2008 
period. It plots the house price series generated by the model 
against the actual path of house prices as represented by the 
Census quality-adjusted index for new houses. To simulate the 
model, we base transitory shocks, as well as underlying regime 
shifts, on estimates produced using the Kahn-Rich methodology. 
Our results reveal that variation in trend productivity growth 
accounts for a substantial portion of the timing and magnitude of 
house price variation. Although the model fails to predict house 
price movements in the 1960s very accurately (possibly because 
the large housing stock produced during the postwar homebuild-
ing boom and the unusually small cohort of people born during 
the Great Depression together kept demand for housing—and 
therefore the price of housing—lower than expected), it success-
fully predicts the house price trends in subsequent decades. Note 
in particular the run-up in prices captured by the model begin-
ning in the 1990s and the sharp downturn beginning in 2007.
11  Speciﬁ  cally, inﬂ  ation-adjusted mean family income grew at a 0.95 percent annual 
rate from 1973 to 1996 and 1.1 percent rate from 1996 to 2005—only the slightest 
increase despite the much larger increase in productivity growth. However, much of the 
growth in the earlier period was attributable to an increase in the number of earners 
per family. In families with one earner, mean real income grew only 0.3 percent from 
1973 to 1996, compared with 1.4 percent from 1996 to 2005 (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 
Historical Income Tables, Table F-12). 
Source: Author’s calculations.
Note: Forecasts are based on data through the month indicated.
Chart 4
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To be sure, the model’s price series leads the data in the 1990s—
perhaps because the real-time data methodology is too effective 
at detecting trend productivity changes—but overall it captures 
the boom and subsequent downturn remarkably well.12 
The close association revealed by the model between turn-
ing points in house prices and changes in trend productivity 
does not preclude the inﬂ  uence of other factors on the housing 
sector. Chart 5 shows, in addition to the deviation in the 1960s, 
other notable, though relatively transient, intervals in which the 
actual path of prices departs from the model’s predictions, and 
thus suggests that other factors may be at play. One such factor 
is interest rates. Many analysts and policymakers believe that a 
reduction in real interest rates in the early part of this decade, 
possibly stemming from a worldwide “saving glut” (Bernanke 
2005), contributed to the housing boom in the United States and 
elsewhere. Our model can be adapted to analyze the impact of 
changes in interest rates on house prices  (see Kahn [2008b]). 
It suggests that while a reduction in interest rates can have a 
sizable impact on the level of housing prices—indeed on all asset 
prices—the effect on asset price appreciation is necessarily 
transitory. For example, a persistent 1 percent reduction in real 
interest rates could increase house prices by 3 percent or more, 
depending on how long the reduction is expected to persist, but 
it could not lead to sustained growth in house prices. That out-
come would require continually declining real interest rates, not 
just a low level of rates. Therefore, lower interest rates in and of 
themselves would have had a more short-lived impact on house 
prices, and thus might have been a contributing factor—but not 
the primary force—behind the most recent housing boom.
12  The model’s general tendency to lead the data is illustrated by the fact that 
the model’s predicted price is more highly correlated with actual prices one year 
ahead than with contemporaneous prices.
In addition, we do not rule out some independent effect of 
other changes in credit conditions, such as those that undoubt-
edly occurred in the 1970s when high inﬂ  ation and ceilings on 
interest rates led to massive withdrawals from the banking 
system, or the more recent subprime mortgage boom and bust. 
Our model, however, sharply limits the scope of these effects, 
because much of the price variation is explained without them. 
Indeed, our analysis suggests a sequence of events for the 
recent housing downturn that differs markedly from that put 
forward by analysts who see tighter credit conditions as the chief 
source of the downturn. In our view, the productivity slowdown 
that started in 2004—or, more accurately, its gradual recognition 
by 2007—put an end to the boom that began in the mid-1990s, 
as residential investment plummeted and house prices began 
to decline. Higher interest rates and the rise in foreclosures may 
have exacerbated the downturn—and made its impact more 
visible—but they were not the ultimate cause of the housing bust. 
Thus, we suggest that changing economic fundamentals brought 
down the housing market and led to the ﬁ  nancial distress—not 
the other way around.
This view gains further support through examination of the 
boom-and-bust cycle that occurred in the 1970s and 1980s, 
arguably driven by similar fundamentals but not subsequently 
associated with comparable ﬁ  nancial turmoil. During that 
episode, loan-to-value ratios were lower than in the recent period 
and adjustable-rate mortgages were generally unavailable. As 
Gorton (2008) argues, these factors, as exempliﬁ  ed by the typical 
subprime mortgage, played a crucial role in increasing the sen-
sitivity of mortgage assets to home prices in the recent episode. 
In addition, the extent of real price declines in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s was masked to some degree by higher inﬂ  a-
tion, making nominal home price declines—and the associated 
phenomenon of borrowers owning a house worth less than the 
principal owed on the mortgage—less common. Yet, despite the 
absence of credit market factors often judged to be the source of 
the recent housing market developments, prices in the 1970s and 
1980s displayed a boom-and-bust pattern not unlike the pattern 
of the last decade, as shown in Chart 1. Thus, it seems reasonable 
to assign primacy to fundamentals and only a supporting role to 
bubbles and credit market irregularities.
These ﬁ  ndings, together with the previous discussion of the 
relationship between productivity growth, income, and housing 
prices, suggest the following scenario for the most recent housing 
cycle: With the resurgence in productivity that began in 1995, 
market participants began to see stronger income growth—not 
from working longer hours or having a second household income, 
but on a per hour basis. As individuals became more aware that 
this stronger growth was attributable to technological progress 
and that it might be sustainable, they grew more optimistic about 
their future income, and this optimism directly inﬂ  uenced their 
willingness to pay for housing. Such optimism would likely have 
been shared by lenders, who viewed mortgages as less risky 
Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census; author’s calculations. 
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insofar as income and house prices were growing more rapidly 
than before.
A decade later, however, signs emerged that the new period of 
high productivity growth would not be as long-lived as the post–
World War II episode, which had lasted more than twenty-ﬁ  ve 
years. As buyers and lenders began to recognize this, the same 
process that caused prices to rise and credit conditions to ease 
began to work in reverse. The expected income growth did not 
materialize and new buyers entering the market were less willing 
to pay high prices; thus, prices of houses purchased in recent 
years failed to grow as expected. Foreclosures began to increase 
as early as 2005, and lenders became more cautious.
Conclusion
This article argues that the current housing crisis stemmed in 
large measure from a change in economic fundamentals and 
was only exacerbated by credit market conditions. Indeed, what 
appear in retrospect to be relatively lax credit conditions in the 
early part of this decade may have emerged in part because of 
then-justiﬁ  able, although ultimately misplaced, optimism about 
income growth. The subsequent credit crunch can be traced 
at least in part to a productivity slowdown that began in 2004 
but was likely not recognized until 2007. With the slowdown in 
productivity came a slowdown in the growth and expected future 
growth of income, which helped to stiﬂ  e the housing boom and 
jeopardize mortgages and other investments predicated on 
ongoing growth. Thus, the U.S. housing sector served as the pro-
verbial “canary in the mineshaft,” providing the earliest indication 
of a deterioration in underlying economic conditions.
The link between productivity and the housing price down-
turn has important implications going forward. An understand-
ing of this relationship provides insight into the role played by 
fundamentals in determining the long-term path of home prices. 
For example, if productivity growth reverts to the higher rates 
seen in 1996-2004 and 1947-72, our model suggests that housing 
prices will bottom out and begin growing again faster than over-
all inﬂ  ation. Even if productivity growth remains slow, the model 
implies that housing price declines will ease; but it also suggests 
that prices could continue to fall modestly on an inﬂ  ation-
adjusted basis, as they did in the 1980s and 1990s. Furthermore, 
a clear understanding of the primary determinants of house 
prices may help inform policy decisions affecting the current 
crisis—for instance, by enabling policymakers to gauge the 
potential impact of credit market interventions on home prices.
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APPENDIX
Housing Price Fundamentals
Housing rents represent the market price that consumers pay for 
housing services. From the property owner’s perspective, rental income 
net of expenses is analogous to the dividends earned from holding 
shares of common stock. Because the owner has the option to sell the 
property and put the proceeds in an interest-bearing security, he must 
expect a rate of return, adjusted for risk, comparable to the rate on other 
investments. If Rt denotes rental income net of taxes and expenses in 
year t, it should obey the relationship
Rt + E {Pt +1}Pt = rt Pt  ,
where Pt is the price of the property at the beginning of year t, rt is the 
interest rate available on an alternative asset, and E{Pt +1} is the expected 
price as of year t+1. The left side represents the total return (income 
plus capital gains) expected from owning the property, while the right 
side is the return on an alternative investment with similar risks.
By itself, this relationship has no economic content other than 
“the law of one price,” or what ﬁ  nancial economists refer to as “no 
arbitrage”—namely, that risk-adjusted returns should be equalized. 
In particular, while the relationship implies that the rent-price ratio 
Rt /Pt should be reduced by expected capital gains—it implies that the 
rent-price ratio is negatively related to expected appreciation rate 
Et {(Pt +1Pt )/Pt }—it does not explain which factors drive those 
expectations. Identifying the factors is one goal of this article. The 
relationship can also be rearranged into another familiar form in which 
the current price equals the present discounted value of expected future 
net rental income. Thus, a property’s price reﬂ  ects expectations of future 
interest rates, rents, and expenses.